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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

25X1 Wilhelm Koenen, Chairman of the Central Council of the National Front,
in an address [redacted] at the Karl
25X1 Marx Academy, Klein-Machnow, on 5 June 1950, offered the following
comments on the National Front and related problem of bloc partnership:

1. Based on the deliberations of the session of the SED Party Directorate on 2 and 3 June 1950 which had determined the existence of sectarian tendencies within the National Front, Koenen stressed the importance of enlisting the cooperation of the farming population and demanded that the existing ties be strengthened. Regarding the treatment meted out to craftsmen by the DDR, he pointed out the necessity of breaking them of their expropriation psychosis, but at the same time also of ridding them of their proprietary instincts and of winning them for the National Front.
2. Even more complicated was the situation in small business. Small business is in a decline and consequently faces the DDR with distrust and sensitiveness. In dealing with this problem the SED has to show reticence and had best blame the existing bad situation on Fascism. Taking this as a point of departure, one should accuse the backers of Fascism, the monopoly-capitalists. An attempt should be made to win over small business, too.
3. Dwelling on the problems involved in enlisting the support of the so-called technical intelligentsia, Koenen based his comments on statements made by Professor Robert Rompe before the assembled Party Directorate on 2 and 3 June 1950. Rompe, according to Koenen, pointed out that it was absolutely necessary to make sacrifices in order to win the support of the technical intelligentsia (employees and independent entrepreneurs) with those engaging in science and research offering better opportunities for approach than the others. We are basically agreed that the technical intelligentsia is of the utmost importance for our purposes. What is the situation among members of this group? Many among them are resigned, lack drive, show no activity. In dealing with the problems involved we have reached a point at which production increases at a faster pace than the progressive political attitude of our technicians. We are feeling the loss of technicians and this can become a great

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

sense to our production. All flights to the West should be a matter of concern to us. The Americans finance these flights, in some instances through German private industries. The enemy senses our weakness and endeavors to aggravate it. To counter this bad situation, Rompe made the following suggestions: A first step would be to take stock of the situation. If we marshal our arguments effectively (wenn wir richtig diskutieren), it should be possible to win over the technical intelligentsia during this period of successes. It is imperative that they not be so frightened that they join the opposition. Their current reticence could be evaluated as a positive expression indicative of their pondering the issues. For that very reason it is necessary at this time to point out to them the perspectives of their work and to reassure them again and again that they are producing for the cause of peace.*

4. In dealing with intellectuals we shall have to allow for and reckon with bourgeois phenomena. Our work along those lines, however, is exceedingly poor, in particular that performed by the Kulturbund. In this respect the students of the Karl Marx Academy are charged with special responsibilities. The government of the DDR is also bearing its share. One should never lose sight of the fact that the intelligentsia enjoys a wide radius of action in bringing to bear its influence upon the bourgeoisie. This applies particularly to writers and teachers. We desire to avail ourselves of this exceptionally wide scope of influence. It is time for the working class to move closer to the intelligentsia. Attempts at effecting such an approach have been made. The intelligentsia on its part is to a high degree prepared to respond. The implementation of our bloc policy will become easier in direct proportion to the extent to which we succeed in winning them over. Whereas in the case of the farmers numbers are the decisive factor, in the case of the intelligentsia it is their scope of influence.
5. The bloc policy is essential for reconstruction in the DDR. It does not actually initiate a socialist development, but it creates the necessary prerequisite, constituting a first success along the road of reconstruction. The bourgeois parties have made concessions. Decisive steps could be taken in conjunction with them. Now we are speaking the common language of the National Front. It is very important that we do away with erroneous notions about political minorities. The one thing which in our dealings with bourgeois parties we are unable to by-pass is their veto power. Within the framework of the bloc policy that is a deciding factor. One cannot say that the bloc parties are being discriminated against. Frequently, it must be admitted, they lack the necessary strength. It should be understood though that this fact alone does not give them authority to step out of line. Ideological questions are fixed. There are many specific questions, however, on which agreement can be reached. Our bloc policy has nothing to do with coalition working at cross purposes, but a bloc working in unison. We do not coerce the minority, but the working class is naturally bearing the main brunt of our work**
6. Election preparation on the basis of the bloc policy. The reason why the date set for elections had to be put off until October 15th was that we needed time to get matters straightened out between us and the bourgeois parties. The existence of the NDP and the Bauernpartei was a favorable circumstance. The main task working toward October 15th consists in arriving at a community of formulations. We should be conciliatory in our tone without, however, allowing changes. We have been drawn closer to each other, because a community of destiny has become a necessity. One bourgeois politician after the other joins in with the fight against American

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Imperialism. The terminology has already begun to flow naturally. We shall also speak a common language before the elections take place. Our current task is to radiate a desire to reach an understanding with the West (i.e. Western Germany). Contacts are to be stepped up. Problems of national existence are to be broached to the masses in the whole of Germany. There should be concentration on the main problems. Political enlightenment is decisive. The forthcoming elections should not merely result in achieving a formal, anonymous, passive majority, but an active majority which is conscious of its responsibilities and which works on the basis of the National Front program.

25X1 [] Comment: It is not quite clear from the context what Rompe said and what statements were added by Koenen by way of comment).

25X1 [] Comment: These statements are obviously replete with Mesopian language and an exegesis appears called for to extract the true meaning.)

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